Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 20 | Issue 2

Article 12

3-1-2006

Same-Sex Marriage: When Will It Reach Utah?
Robert Wintemute

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Robert Wintemute, Same-Sex Marriage: When Will It Reach Utah?, 20 BYU J. Pub. L. 527 (2006).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol20/iss2/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Same-Sex Marriage: When Will It Reach Utah?
Robert Wintemute∗
Attempts to amend constitutions so as to make legal1 marriage
impossible for same-sex couples are futile. Amendments of this kind are
nothing more than temporary “legal dikes” designed to create “legal
islands” in which a heterosexual majority can continue to discriminate
against a lesbian and gay minority in relation to access to legal marriage.
These amendments seek to strip the gay and lesbian minority of any
possibility of seeking protection against such discrimination from either
the legislature or the courts. Where such amendments have been adopted,
they will eventually be repealed or invalidated, because the “incoming
tide,” i.e., the long-term international trend, will eventually bring full
legal equality to our fellow human beings who happen to be lesbian and
gay individuals, or members of same-sex couples, with or without
children.
The first part of my handout2 illustrates two international trends
regarding equal access to legal marriage for same-sex couples. What I
call “International Trend No. 1” is “treating sexual orientation as a
suspect (or quasi-suspect) classification,” i.e., a classification that is
presumed unconstitutional and requires a strong justification when used
by a government. This is something that has been avoided by U.S. courts
in recent decisions such as Romer v. Evans,3 Baker v. State of Vermont,4
Lawrence v. Texas,5 and Goodridge v. Department of Public Health6. In
∗
B.A. (Alberta), LL.B., B.C.L. (McGill), D.Phil. (Oxford). Member of New York Bar
(Associate, Milbank Tweed, 1982-87). Professor of Human Rights Law, School of Law, King’s
College, University of London, England, United Kingdom. This is a revised version of a presentation
given at the Federal Marriage Amendment Symposium held at Brigham Young University on
September 9, 2005.
1. I will refer to “legal marriage” (a marriage with legal but not religious consequences) and
“religious marriage” (a marriage with religious but not legal consequences), but not “civil marriage”
(a marriage performed by a state official with legal but nor religious consequences). In some
European countries, like the Netherlands, Belgium and France, “civil marriage” and “legal marriage”
are synonymous, because a religious marriage can never be a legal marriage (have legal
consequences). This is not true in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States, where a
marriage performed by a religious official (eg, in a Christian church) can be simultaneously a legal
marriage and a religious marriage.
2. The first part of the handout follows this transcript as Appendix A.
3. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
4. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
5. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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all of these decisions, the courts have used a powerful form of rational
basis review, and thus avoided the real question: whether or not
classifications (differences in treatment) based on sexual orientation
should be treated in the same way as classifications based on race,
religion or sex. The debate is ongoing, certainly at the federal level in the
United States, and most state supreme courts also seem to have managed
to avoid answering this question.
International Trend No. 1 is to treat sexual orientation as similar to
race, religion and sex, and therefore to require the same level of scrutiny
for claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation as for claims of
discrimination based on race, religion or sex. This trend manifests itself
in two ways. First, since 1989, when a new constitutional bill of rights is
being drafted, it is increasingly common to insert sexual orientation into
the list7 of presumptively prohibited grounds in the provision that
prohibits discrimination. In the handout, you will see a list of the
constitutions of nation-states,8 or of constituent states within a federal
system,9 that mention sexual orientation in their lists of such grounds.
The best known and most influential of these provisions is the one in the
South African Constitution, because South Africa is a country where the
majority of people know what discrimination means, having suffered
racial discrimination for decades.10 The first example at the international
level is Article 21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union,11 which builds on Article 13 of the European
Community Treaty.12 Although the Charter is only a political

6. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
7. Although the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution contains no list of grounds (and
does not even mention race), most other national constitutions and international human rights treaties
contain such a list.
8. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA ACT (No. 200 of 1993) § 8(2);
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA ACT (No. 108 of 1996) § 9(3); FIJI ISLANDS,
CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT ACT 1997 § 38(2)(a); ECUADOR CONST. art. XXIII, § 3 (1998);
PORTUGAL CONST. art. XIII, § 2 (as amended in 2004).
9. Brazil, States of MATO GROSSO CONST. art. X, § 3 (1989), and SERGIPE CONST. art. III, §
2 (1989); Germany, States of BRANDENBURG CONST. art. XII, § 2 (1992); THURINGIA CONST. art. II,
§ 3 (1993); BERLIN CONST. art. X, § 2 (1995).
10. “The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or
more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour,
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.” S. AFR.
CONST. 1996 § 9(3) (emphasis added).
11. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. XXI § 1 (EC 2000), available
at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/c_364/c_36420001218en00010022.pdf (last visited
May 8, 2006).
12. See http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/index.htm (last visited May 8, 2006).
Added in 1997, Article 13 does not itself prohibit discrimination, but gives the European Community
legislature clear power to “take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation” (emphasis added).
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proclamation that is not yet legally binding,13 its Article 21(1) was
intended to be a “state of the art” anti-discrimination provision for the
21st century, by including grounds of discrimination that have only been
recognized recently such as disability, age, sexual orientation, and
genetic features (a ground that could become more significant in the
future).14
The second way in which International Trend No. 1 manifests itself
is through judicial interpretation of existing anti-discrimination
provisions of national constitutions or international human rights treaties,
which do not expressly mention sexual orientation. Often, these
provisions were drafted long before anyone was talking about sexual
orientation, and are difficult to amend. Yet, there is a trend towards
acknowledging that sexual orientation is one of the grounds that is
deserving of heightened scrutiny under such provisions. The Supreme
Court of Canada reached that conclusion unanimously in 1995.15 The
European Court of Human Rights, in a series of decisions, has made
express or implied analogies between sexual orientation and race,
religion or sex,16 and the United Nations Human Rights Committee has
13. Article II-81(1) of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (signed on 29 Oct.
2004) is identical to Article XXI(1) of the Charter, and would become legally binding if the Treaty
were ratified by all 25 European Union member states (the ratification process has been stalled due
to negative referendum results in France and the Netherlands in 2005).
14. “Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social
origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a
national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.” Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. XXI § I (emphasis added).
15. See Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, ¶ 5, 173-175 (the Court held by 9 votes to 0
that, under Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, part of the federal
Constitution of Canada, sexual orientation is an “analogous ground” of discrimination, analogous to
the “enumerated grounds”: race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability). The Court held by 5 votes to 4 that providing a social security benefit to
unmarried different-sex couples but not to unmarried same-sex couples was prima facie
discrimination based on sexual orientation that the federal government had to justify, and by 5 votes
to 4 (one judge having switched sides), that the discrimination could be justified. See Robert
Wintemute, “Discrimination Against Same-Sex Couples: Sections 15(1) and 1 of the Charter: Egan
v. Canada,” (1995) 74 Canadian Bar Review 682-713. The Court implicitly overruled the result in
Egan (by 8 votes to 1) in M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3.
16. See Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 493, ¶ 97 (1999) (stating that
“[t]o the extent that they represent a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a
homosexual minority, these negative attitudes [of heterosexual members of the armed forces] cannot,
of themselves, be considered by the Court to amount to sufficient justification for the interferences
with the [lesbian and gay members’] rights . . . any more than similar negative attitudes towards
those of a different race, origin or colour” (emphasis added)); Mouta v. Portugal, Eur. Ct. H.R.
Application no. 33290/96, ¶ 36 (Dec. 21, 1999) (“the [Lisbon] Court of Appeal [by transferring
custody of a child from her gay father to her heterosexual mother] made a distinction based on
considerations regarding the applicant’s sexual orientation, a distinction which is not acceptable
under the [European] Convention [on Human Rights] [like distinctions based on religion] (see,
mutatis mutandis, . . . Hoffmann . . . [Jehovah’s Witness mother])”); S.L. v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶
37 (2003) (“[T]he Court reiterates that sexual orientation is a concept covered by Article 14 [the
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recently interpreted the anti-discrimination provision that it is responsible
for enforcing as including sexual orientation.17 Time does not permit me
to discuss the analogies between sexual orientation and race, religion or
sex. However, if you turn to my egocentric reading list (page ten of the
handout), which cites only my own publications,18 you will find the
published book version of my doctoral thesis, Sexual Orientation and
Human Rights, which analyzes these analogies at length.19 Sexual
orientation can be compared to race because many lesbian and gay
people would say that their emotional and sexual attractions to persons of
the same sex are immutable: they did not choose these internal feelings
and have no control over them, just as people cannot choose their race.
Acting on those feelings (by engaging in same-sex sexual activity or
establishing a long-term couple relationship) brings in a voluntary
element, which makes sexual orientation similar to religion – a
fundamental choice that should be respected in the same way that
religious practices are respected. Finally, in the case of sex, the argument
is not that sexual orientation is “like” sex (other than in the sense that the
feelings related to sexual orientation are immutable), but that sexual
orientation discrimination is generally also sex discrimination, even
when it relates to chosen conduct. If most cases of sexual orientation
discrimination are analyzed correctly, it can be seen that they are
simultaneously cases of sex discrimination, because a rule is telling
people that how they are permitted to live their lives depends on the sex
chromosomes with which they were born.20
‘equal protection clause’ of the European Convention] . . . Just like differences [in treatment] based
on sex [emphasis added], . . . differences [in treatment] based on sexual orientation require
particularly serious reasons by way of justification . . .”).
17. See Young v. Australia (Communication No. 941/2000), United Nations Human Rights
Committee,
6
Aug.
2003,
¶
10.4,
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/385c2add1632f4a8c12565a9004dc311/3c839cb2ae3bef6fc1256da
c002b3034?OpenDocument (“[T]he prohibition against discrimination under article 26 [of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by the USA in 1992] comprises also
discrimination based on sexual orientation.”).
18. See, e.g., ROBERT WINTEMUTE, From “Love Rights” to “Sex Rights”: Partnership
Rights as Human Rights, in SEX RIGHTS (Nicholas Bamforth ed., Oxford University Press 2005);
ROBERT WINTEMUTE, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
COMMUNITY (Colin Harvey ed., Oxford: Hart Publishing 2005); ROBERT WINTEMUTE, Strasbourg
to the Rescue? Same-Sex Partners and Parents Under the European Convention, in LEGAL
RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Wintemute ed., Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001).
19. ROBERT WINTEMUTE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION, AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER (Oxford University
Press 1997).
20. Robert Wintemute, Recognising New Kinds of Direct Sex Discrimination:
Transsexualism, Sexual Orientation and Dress Codes, 60 MOD. L. REV. 334 (1997); Robert
Wintemute, Sex Discrimination in MacDonald and Pearce: Why the Law Lords Chose the Wrong
Comparators, 14 KING’S C. L.J. 267 (2003).
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International Trend No. 2 is the gradual, historical trend towards the
elimination of all public-sector sexual orientation discrimination, and the
prohibition of many forms of private-sector sexual orientation
discrimination. International Trend No. 2 is merely the application, to
specific areas of law or life, of the principle that results from
International Trend No. 1: all sexual orientation discrimination is
presumptively a violation of national constitutional rights or international
human rights, and requires a strong justification. The typical steps in the
elimination of sexual orientation discrimination are: (1) repeal of the
death penalty for some or all forms of sexual activity between men or
between women; (2) repeal of all criminal prohibitions of private, adult,
consensual, same-sex sexual activity, which means that lesbian women
and gay men can no longer be considered as criminals; (3) passage of
legislation prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in public and
private employment or services, which means that lesbian women and
gay men are viewed as equal citizens and entitled, as individuals (but not
as members of same-sex couples), to equal opportunities in society; and
(4) provision of equal rights to same-sex couples, including equal access
to legal marriage and joint or second-parent adoption of children.
With regard to step (1), one example was Connecticut Colony’s 1642
statute, apparently plagiarized from Leviticus,21 which authorized the
death penalty for male-male anal intercourse: “If any man lyeth with
mankind as hee lyeth with woman, both of them have committed
abomination, they both shall surely be put to death.”22 In the 21st
century, as a small but growing number of countries permit same-sex
couples to contract legal marriages, it is important to remember that the
death penalty was the starting point for legal reforms in relation to samesex couples. This allows us to appreciate how far they have come. As
recently as 1860 in England, Wales and Ireland (1888 in Scotland), two
men living together as a couple and having a sexual relationship risked
execution by hanging.23 That was the respect that was accorded to samesex couples by British law in the 19th century.
Fortunately, we’ve moved on from there. I trust that no one in this
room would say, “Bring back the death penalty because Leviticus
requires it!” Leviticus, for me, as a human rights lawyer, is a nightmare,
21. Leviticus 20:13 (King James).
22. Quoted in the exhibition “The Pink and the Blue: Lesbian and Gay Life at Yale and in
Connecticut, 1642-2004,” Sterling Library, Yale University (2004) (Jonathan Ned Katz, curator).
The exhibition noted that William Plaine was executed in New Haven in 1646 for “sodomy.” The
crime was extended to female-female sexual activity by the New Haven Colony in 1656.
23. Statutes authorizing the death penalty for male-male anal intercourse were repealed in
1861 in England, Ireland and Wales, and in 1889 in Scotland. See PAUL CRANE, GAYS AND THE
LAW, 12 (London, Pluto Press, 1982).
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and I’m grateful that most of Leviticus is ignored by Christians who
otherwise take the texts of the Bible very seriously. Remember that
Leviticus would also support the death penalty for cursing one of your
parents, committing adultery, committing blasphemy (in which case you
should be stoned by your congregation), or being a wizard: in each case,
the guilty party “shall surely be put to death.”24 Leviticus is silent as to
the penalty for breaching its injunction not to wear “a garment mingled
of linen and woollen,” but authorizes “eye for eye, tooth for tooth”
justice (e.g., the state may cut off the leg of a person convicted of
causing the amputation of the leg of another).25
After the repeal of the death penalty for some or all forms of samesex sexual activity (which has still to take place in Afghanistan, Iran,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and a few other Muslim-majority countries, as
well as some states of Nigeria),26 a country, state or province can move
on to steps (2), (3) and (4). The two tables of data in the handout (one for
Europe and one for Canada and the U.S.) give the years in which various
countries (or parts of countries) in Europe, provinces in Canada, or states
in the U.S., have taken these steps.27 For Canada and the U.S., the step
(2) year is the one in which private, consensual, adult same-sex sexual
activity was decriminalized, whereas for Europe, it is the more
significant year in which the age of consent to sexual activity was
equalized for male-female, male-male and female-female sexual activity.
After decriminalization, most European countries chose to continue to
condemn and stigmatize same-sex sexual activity by imposing a higher
age of consent.
For Europe, Canada and the U.S., step (4) has been divided into five
sub-steps: (a) allowing one same-sex partner to adopt the other partner’s
child, i.e., second-parent adoption; (b) allowing a same-sex couple to
adopt jointly a child who is not related to either partner; (c) allowing
same-sex couples to register their relationships and acquire some of the
rights and duties of married couples, without calling the registration a
legal marriage; (d) allowing same-sex couples to register their
relationships and acquire all of the rights and duties of married couples
(except possibly in relation to adoption and medically assisted
procreation), without calling the registration a legal marriage; and (e)
allowing same-sex couples to contract legal marriages and acquire all of
the rights and duties of married couples. Sub-steps (a) and (b) have
24. Leviticus 20: 9, 10, 27; 24: 16 (King James).
25. Id. at 19: 19; 24: 20.
26. See
http://www.ilgaeurope.org/europe/publications/non_periodical/rights_not_crimes_
april_2005.
27. See Appendices A and B.
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generally come before sub-steps (c), (d) and (e) in Canada and the U.S.,
because legislatures and courts often consider that the possibility of
adoption by a same-sex couple is in the best interests of the child, even if
the legislature or court is not yet ready to grant the child’s parents equal
access to rights and duties as a couple. In Europe, the order has varied. In
2003, Belgium introduced legal marriage for same-sex couples without
the right to adopt a child jointly, whereas in 2002, Sweden, as well as
England and Wales, introduced joint adoption by same-sex couples but
continue to exclude them from legal marriage. However, as of April 20,
2006, 9 countries28 in Europe had decided to allow joint and secondparent adoption, or only second-parent adoption, but only 3 had granted
equal access to legal marriage to same-sex couples. Thus, in Europe,
Canada and the U.S., it can be said that equal access to legal marriage is
legally and politically harder to achieve than equal access to joint
adoption. However, there is one clear difference. In Canada, the U.S. and
the United Kingdom, the most common order has been: (a)-(b) adoption
rights; (c)-(d) a broader package of rights for same-sex couples; (e) equal
access to legal marriage. In Continental Europe, the most common order
has been: (c)-(d) a broad package of rights for same-sex couples
(excluding adoption rights); (a)-(b) adoption rights; (e) equal access to
legal marriage.
The table on Canada and the U.S. allows you to see where Utah
stands in relation to International Trend No. 2.29 Step (2), repeal of the
criminal prohibition of same-sex or different-sex oral or anal intercourse
(“sodomy”), was not taken voluntarily by the legislature or the courts in
Utah, and had to be imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence v.
Texas in 2003.30 In the case of different-race marriage, Utah acted
voluntarily, albeit very late, repealing its ban31 only four years before the
U.S. Supreme Court struck down the remaining state anti-miscegenation
laws in Loving v. Virginia in 1967. Utah has yet to take step (3), passing
a law prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in employment or
services, and steps (4)(a)-(e) do not seem imminent, in light of the 2004
amendment to the Utah Constitution defining marriage as only between
“a man and a woman.”32 Clearly there is a long way to go, but I would
28. The two countries not listed in Appendix A are Iceland and Norway.
29. See Appendix B.
30. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
31. Utah Code Annotated s. 30-1-2, repealed in 1963, prohibited marriages: “(5) Between a
negro and a white person. (6) Between a Mongolian, member of the Malay race or a mulatto,
quadroon, or octoroon, and a white person.”
32. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 29 (added in 2004): “(1) Marriage consists only of
the legal union between a man and a woman. (2) No other domestic union, however denominated,
may be recognized as a marriage or given the same or substantially equivalent legal effect.”
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argue that these steps are historically inevitable – it is therefore only a
question of time before they will be taken in Utah, either voluntarily or
involuntarily, as a result of the intervention of the U.S. Supreme Court or
Congress.
Turning to the topic of today’s symposium, if we look back five
years to September 2000, no country in the world granted equal access to
legal marriage to same-sex couples. This form of equality for the lesbian
and gay minority that exists in every country is very new. But the
number of countries that have decided to grant it, so as to eliminate the
last major form of discrimination based on sexual orientation, is growing,
slowly but steadily. The first country to do so was the Netherlands, in
December 2000.33 In accordance with Dutch tradition regarding this kind
of social issue, it was the legislature that took this step rather than the
Dutch Supreme Court.34 The example of the Netherlands strongly
influenced the legislature of its neighbor, Belgium, which adopted a
similar law in 2003.35 Spain, which has taken human rights very
seriously since the return of democracy in 1978 (after the death of the
dictator Franco in 1975), built on a series of laws recognizing same-sex
couples at the regional level by granting equal access to legal marriage
and joint adoption in 2005.36 The fourth European country to open up
33. Act of 21 December 2000 amending Book 1 of the Civil Code, concerning the opening
up of marriage for persons of the same sex (Act on the Opening Up of Marriage), Staatsblad 2001,
nr. 9, http://athena.leidenuniv.nl/rechten/meijers/index.php3?m=10&c=86 (last visited May 8, 2006),
in force 1 April 2001: Article 30: “1. A marriage can be contracted by two persons of different sex or
of the same sex. 2. The law only considers marriage in its civil relations.”
34. Dutch courts do not have the power to strike down Acts of the Dutch Parliament that
violate the equality provision of the Dutch Constitution. See Kees Waaldijk, Constitutional
Protection Against Discrimination of Homosexuals, (1986-87) 13 JOURNAL OF HOMOSEXUALITY 57.
They do have the power to strike down laws that violate an international human rights treaty, but the
Dutch Supreme Court has been reluctant to depart from the case-law of the European Court of
Human Rights with respect to the right to marry. And with respect to the right to be free from
discrimination, the Dutch courts often refer controversial issues to Parliament, rather than find a
violation of Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, or of Article 26 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Both these practices of judicial restraint led to
the rejection, by the Dutch Supreme Court in 1990, of a claim by two women who wanted to marry
each other. See Hoge Raad (Supreme Court), Oct. 19, 1990, [1992] Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, No.
129; see also Kees Waaldijk, “How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the Netherlands,”
in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Wintemute ed., Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001).
35. Law of 13 Feb. 2003 opening up marriage to persons of the same sex and modifying
certain provisions of the Civil Code), Moniteur belge, 28 Feb. 2003, Edition 3, p. 9880, available at
http://www.moniteur.be/index_fr.htm (last visited May 8, 2006), Moniteur belge, electronic item
2003009163), in force 1 June 2003: Art. 143. – “Two persons of different sex or of the same sex
may contract marriage.”
36. Law 13/2005, of 1 July, providing for the amendment of the Civil Code with regard to the
right to contract marriage), Boletín Oficial del Estado no. 157, 2 July 2005, pp. 23632-23634,
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2005-07-02/pdfs/A23632-23634.pdf (in force 3 July 2005): Article 44
(new second para.): “Marriage shall have the same requirements and effects whether both parties are
of the same or different sex.”
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legal marriage to same-sex couples is likely to be Sweden, where a
parliamentary commission of inquiry is currently studying the question.37
Unlike European countries, where courts have been reluctant to
strike down laws excluding same-sex couples from legal marriage, and
have left the question to the legislature,38 Canada and South Africa have
new, but robust, traditions of judicial review of discriminatory laws
under their constitutional bills of rights: the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, added to Canada’s federal Constitution in 1982;39 and the
Bill of Rights in South Africa’s final Constitution, adopted in 199640.
This judicial review has, to a large extent, been inspired by judicial
review under the federal and state Constitutions in the U.S.
In Canada in 2003, both the Ontario Court of Appeal41 and the
British Columbia Court of Appeal42 held that that the common-law
definition of marriage as between persons of different sexes constituted
unjustifiable discrimination based on sexual orientation, contrary to
Section 15(1), the equality provision of the Charter. To eliminate the
discrimination, both courts reformulated the common-law definition of
marriage as being the union of “two persons.” Unlike the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Goodridge, both courts gave
immediate effect to their judgments, and ordered that marriage licenses
be issued to same-sex couples from the dates of the judgments. Same-sex
couples began to marry in Ontario and British Columbia, and in other
provinces and territories as a result of trial court decisions adopting the
same reasoning, which the federal government did not appeal. However,
without a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, or an Act of the
federal Parliament,43 the legal validity of these marriages was not entirely
37. See http://www.homo.se/o.o.i.s/1820 (last visited May 8, 2006).
38. See, e.g., Netherlands, Hoge Raad (Supreme Court), Oct. 19, 1990, [1992] Nederlandse
Jurisprudentie, No. 129l; Germany, Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court), 4 Oct.
4, 1993), [1993] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3058; Spain, Tribunal Constitucional
(Constitutional Court), Auto TC 222/1994 (July 11, 1994); Constitutional Court of Hungary (13 March
1995), 14/1995 (III.13.) AB határozat; see László Sólyom & Georg Brunner, Constitutional
Judiciary in a New Democracy: The Hungarian Constitutional Court (Ann Arbor, Univ. of
Michigan Press, 2000), at 316-21.
39. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, enacted as Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (Acts
of the United Kingdom Parliament, 1982, chapter 11).
40. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA ACT (No. 108 of 1996), Chapter 2.
41. See Halpern v. Att’y Gen. (Canada), [2003] 65 O.R.3d 161.
42. See Barbeau v. Att’y Gen. (British Columbia), [2003] 228 D.L.R. 416, 2003 B.C.C.A.
251; see also Barbeau v. Att’y Gen. (British Columbia), [2003] 225 D.L.R. 472, 2003 B.C.C.A. 406.
43. In Canada, as in the United States., most family law is under the jurisdiction of the
provinces and territories. However, unlike in the United States, there is an exception for “marriage”
(which has been interpreted as meaning capacity to marry) and “divorce,” which fall within the
jurisdiction of the federal Parliament. See Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(26). This means that equal
access to legal marriage for same-sex couples in Canada has been, and remains, a federal question,
which must be answered in the same way for the entire country at the same time. The state-by-state
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certain.
In 2003, the federal Government decided not to appeal the Ontario
and British Columbia decisions, and instead to refer a bill that would
allow same-sex couples to marry to the Supreme Court of Canada, with
questions about the bill’s constitutionality.44 In 2004, the Court held that
the federal Parliament has the constitutional power to pass the bill
(Parliament may pass it), but refused to say whether the equality
provision of the Charter requires the bill (whether Parliament must pass
it).45 In 2005, the federal Parliament passed the bill,46 and therefore
clearly authorized legal marriages by same-sex couples in all ten
provinces and three territories. The only remaining uncertainty is
whether the federal Parliament could constitutionally repeal the 2005
legislation, without invoking Section 33(1) of the Charter, which permits
temporary (five-year) overrides of certain Charter rights, and has never
been used by the federal Parliament. Canadian legal academics
overwhelming support the view that the Supreme Court of Canada would
(in an appropriate case) interpret Section 15(1) of the Charter as
requiring equal access to legal marriage for same-sex couples, and
therefore that the 2005 legislation could not be repealed without invoking
Section 33(1).47 Because capacity to marry is a federal question in
Canada, no province or territory may opt out of the 2005 legislation. I am
from Alberta, Canada’s most conservative province, where the
legislature is as eager as the Utah legislature (and electorate) to exclude
same-sex couples from legal marriage. However, the Alberta
legislature’s attempt to do so in 2000 was clearly beyond its
constitutional powers.48
In South Africa, applying the express prohibition of sexual
orientation discrimination in the 1996 Constitution, the Constitutional
Court has developed what is probably the strongest case-law in the world
in relation to discrimination against same-sex couples.49 In 2004, the
changes to marriage law that are necessary in the United States are not possible in Canada.
44. See Robert Wintemute, Sexual Orientation and the Charter: The Achievement of Formal
Legal Equality (1985-2005) and Its Limits, 49 MCGILL L.J. 1143 (2004), available at
http://www.journal.law.mcgill.ca/abs/vol49/4winte.html (last visited May 8, 2006). Canadian
governments may submit hypothetical questions to the Supreme Court.
45. See Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698.
46. Civil Marriage Act, 2005 S.C., ch. 33, § 2 (Can.) (“Marriage, for civil purposes, is the
lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of all others.”).
47. See http://www.equal-marriage.ca/resource.php?id=143 (last visited May 8, 2006).
48. See Marriage Act, Revised Statutes of Alberta, c. M-5, as amended by Marriage
Amendment Act, 2000, Statutes of Alberta 2000, c. 3: s. 1(c.) (“marriage” means a marriage
between a man and a woman); s. 1.1 (“This Act operates notwithstanding (a) the provisions of
sections 2 and 7 to 15 of the Canadian Charter . . . .” [an invalid attempt to invoke Section 33(1) of
the Charter to insulate the legislation from judicial review]).
49. See http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/home.htm (last visited May 8, 2006): Case
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Supreme Court of Appeal applied this case-law to the common-law
definition of marriage, and concluded that the exclusion of same-sex
couples was discrimination violating the 1996 Constitution.50 This
judgment has been appealed, but I would be very surprised if the
Constitutional Court did not reach the same conclusion as the Supreme
Court of Appeal.51
By Dec. 1, 2006, after only six years, we will have gone from no
countries granting equal access to legal marriage to same-sex couples to
five countries granting such access (the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain,
Canada, and South Africa), along with Massachusetts. Outside the
United States, are there any attempts to prevent the culmination of
International Trend No. 2 (eliminating the last major form of sexual
orientation discrimination, the exclusion of same-sex couples from legal
marriage) through constitutional amendments, such as the proposed
“Federal Marriage Protection Amendment” in the United States? I would
suggest that the countries the United States should compare itself with
are a group of 32 other democracies with good records of protecting
human rights (and combined populations of around 560,000,000, or
nearly double that of the United States): the 25 member states of
European Union,52 Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Canada, South Africa,
Australia and New Zealand. It is easy to browse through the constitutions
of the other 158 or so member states of the United Nations and find
examples of “one man and one woman” definitions of marriage.
However, many of these countries have, by the standards of the United
No. CCT10/99, National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Home Affairs (Dec. 2,
1999) (unmarried same-sex partners entitled to same immigration rights as married different-sex
partners); Case Nos. CCT45/01, CCT48/02, Satchwell v. President of Republic of South Africa (July
25, 2002; March 17, 2003) (unmarried same-sex partners of judges entitled to same employment
benefits as married different-sex partners); Case No. CCT40/01, Suzanne Du Toit & Anna-Marie De
Vos v. Minister for Welfare and Population Development (Sept. 10, 2002) (unmarried same-sex
partners cannot be excluded from the right of married different-sex partners to adopt children
jointly); Case No. CCT46/02, J. & B. v. Director General, Department of Home Affairs (March 28,
2003) (unmarried lesbian partners cannot be excluded from the right of married different-sex
partners to both be registered as the parents of a child born to the wife after donor insemination).
50. Case No. 232/2003, Fourie v. Minister of Home Affairs (Supreme Court of Appeal Nov.
30, 2004), para. 49, http://www.law.wits.ac.za/sca/index.php (declaring with immediate effect that
“the common law concept of marriage is developed to embrace same-sex partners as follows:
‘Marriage is the union of two persons to the exclusion of all others for life,’” but leaving a statutory
obstacle to legal marriage for same-sex couples in place).
51. The Constitutional Court agreed with the Supreme Court of Appeal in Case nos.
CCT60/04, CCT10/05, Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v.
Minister of Home Affairs (Constitutional Court Dec. 1, 2005), http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za
/Archimages/5257.PDF. The Court’s order (at para. 162) gives the South African Parliament until
Dec. 1 , 2006 to pass legislation allowing same-sex couples to marry. If Parliament fails to act, the
Court’s judgment will take effect and the changes to the the Marriage Act (No. 25 of 1961),
necessary to allow same-sex couples to marry, will be “read in,” from Dec. 1, 2006.
52. See http://www.europa.eu.int (last visited May 8, 2006).
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States and the 32 other countries mentioned above, relatively weak
democracies and relatively poor records of protecting human rights.53
Among the 32 democracies mentioned above,54 I found only one
example55 of a constitution in which marriage is clearly defined as
different-sex only, thereby preventing either the legislature or the courts
from granting equal access to legal marriage to same-sex couples. This
example appears in the 1997 Constitution of Poland,56 a country the laws
of which are now heavily influenced by the Roman Catholic Church.
Australia has a federal law similar to the U.S. Defense of Marriage Act,
but which could be repealed tomorrow, because it is an ordinary statute
of the federal (Commonwealth) Parliament and not a part of the
Australian Constitution.57
In most of these 32 democracies, the national or federal constitution
contains no definition of marriage, leaving it up to the legislature to grant
equal access to legal marriage to same-sex couples, or to the courts to
interpret the constitution’s equality clause as requiring equal access. Both
the legislature and the courts are free to do so in accordance with
changing social conditions, and are not required to wait for a
constitutional definition of marriage to be repealed or struck down by a
higher authority. In a few countries, such as Spain, the constitution
contains an ambiguous reference to “man and woman” but does not say
that marriage is only between “a man and a woman.”58 In a pending case,
the Constitutional Court of Spain is likely to interpret this provision as
53. For example, the Constitution of Uganda was amended in 2005 to read: “it is unlawful for
same-sex couples to marry.” See http://www.365gay.com/newscon05/09/093005uganda.htm (last
visited May 8, 2006). See also the (non-constitutional) bill before the Parliament of Nigeria, where
same-sex sexual activity is already criminalized. The bill (introduced in response to the Dec. 1, 2005
judgment of the Constitutional Court of South Africa) goes well beyond defining marriage as only
between “a man and a woman.” The bill will make it an offense, punishable by up to five years in
prison, to be a party to, perform, witness, aid or abet a same-sex marriage, or to be involved in “the
registration of gay clubs, societies and organizations, . . . procession or meetings.” See
http://okrasoup.typepad.com/black_looks/files/nigeria_gay_bill.pdf (last visited May 8, 2006)
(clauses 7-8).
54. Data for the survey is available at http://confinder.richmond.edu (last visited May 8,
2006).
55. A second example was approved by the Parliament of Latvia on Dec. 15, 2005. Amended
Article 110 of the Latvian Constitution now reads: “The State protects and support marriage – a
union between a man and a woman . . . .” See http://www.ilga-europe.org/europe/media/latvia_
cements_homophobia_in_the_constitution.
56. “Marriage, being a union of a man and a woman . . . shall be placed under the protection
and care of the Republic of Poland.” POLAND CONST. art. 18 (1997) (emphasis added) available at
http://poland.pl/info/information_about_poland/constitution/ch1.htm (last visited May 8, 2006).
57. Marriage Amendment Act, 2004 (No. 126 of 2004), available at http://www.austlii.edu.
au/au/legis/cth/num_act/maa2004n1262004192 (last visited May 8, 2006).
58. See SPAIN CONST. art. XXXII, § 1 available at http://www.constitucion.es/constitucion
/lenguas/ingles.html (May 8, 2006) (1978) ([Marriage, Matrimonial Equality]: “Man [el hombre] and
woman [la mujer] have the right to contract matrimony with full legal equality”).
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permitting the 2005 legislation that allowed same-sex couples to marry,
and to remain silent on whether the equality clause of the Spanish
Constitution required the legislation. Some international human rights
treaties refer in a similarly ambiguous way to “men and women,” but do
not say that a man may only marry a woman and that a woman may only
marry a man. Both Article 12 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, and Article 23(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, refer to the right to marry of “men and women of
marriageable age.” The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted
Article 12 as no longer requiring two persons of opposite biological
(chromosomal) sex, in the case of a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual person who sought to marry a non-transsexual man,59 but has
yet to consider the proposed marriage of two non-transsexual men or two
non-transsexual women. The United Nations Human Rights Committee
has considered such a case and concluded that Article 23(2) does not yet
protect the right of a same-sex couple to marry.60 It is important to note
that neither Article 12 nor Article 23(2) has been interpreted as
precluding a country that has ratified either treaty from voluntarily
deciding to allow same-sex couples to marry. Article 9 (right to marry)
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union deletes the
reference to “men and women.” The official comment on Article 9
makes it clear that it is for each member state of the European Union to
decide whether or not to allow same-sex couples to marry.61
It will come as no surprise that I am opposed to the proposed
“Federal Marriage Protection Amendment,” because I think that samesex couples should be granted equal access to legal marriage in Utah and
59. Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom (July 11, 2002), http://www.echr.coe.int
(HUDOC) (last visited May 8, 2006).
60. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 23,§ 2, Dec.16 1966,
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm (last visited May 8, 2006) (“The right
of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized”); Joslin
v. New Zealand (Communication No. 902/1999), U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. ¶ 8.2 (July 17, 2002),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf (last visited May 8, 2006) (stating same-sex marriage
not required because “the treaty obligation of States parties stemming from article 23, paragraph 2,
of the [ICCPR] is to recognize as marriage only the union between a man and a woman wishing to
marry each other”).
61. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ch. 1, art. IX (European
Commission, Dec. 7, 2000), available at http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/docs/2004/4/29
/Explanation%20relating%20to%20the%20complete%20text%20of%20the%20charter.pdf
(last
visited May 8, 2006). Article 9 provides: “The right to marry and the right to found a family shall be
guaranteed in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these rights.” The official
comment on the text states: “The wording of the Article has been modernised to cover cases in
which national legislation recognises arrangements other than marriage for founding a family. This
Article neither prohibits nor imposes the granting of the status of marriage to unions between people
of the same sex. This right is thus similar to that afforded by the [European Convention on Human
Rights], but its scope may be wider when national legislation so provides.”
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every other state in the United States. I would put the proposed
amendment in the same category as other unwise federal constitutional
amendments that have never been adopted:
•

Federal Protection of Democracy Amendment – “Only men
shall be entitled to vote in the United States.”

•

Federal Protection of Religion Amendment –
“Notwithstanding the First Amendment, the only religion
that may be practiced in the United States is Christianity,
which does not include the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints.”

•

Federal Protection of White Supremacy Amendment (1955
version, seeking to prevent Loving v. Virginia in 1967):
“Marriage in the United States is the union of two persons of
the same race.”

Indeed, I would suggest that a more accurate name for the proposed
amendment would be the “Federal Protection of Heterosexual
Supremacy Amendment.” Please note that I am not opposed to
constitutional amendments that overturn decisions of courts. I think that
such amendments are a legitimate part of the democratic process, but that
members of the majority (in this case the heterosexual majority) should
think long and hard before they entrench discrimination against a
minority (in this case the lesbian and gay minority). Constitutions should
be difficult to amend. The Utah Constitution, for example, is much too
easy to amend, given that the 2004 amendment defining marriage as
different-sex only62 took less than one year. This does not give the
majority sufficient time to reflect before entrenching discrimination
against a minority.
The arguments against equal access to legal marriage for same-sex
couples are astonishingly weak. They can be summarized as follows:
1. (the heterosexual majority’s) tradition (“it’s always been this
way”);
2. religious objections (“not in my church/synagogue/mosque”);
3. marriage is for procreation (“Adam and Eve, not Adam and
Steve”);

62. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 29.
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4. slippery slope (“what about incest and polygamy?”);
5. devaluation of marriage for different-sex couples (“get your own
institution”); and
6. same-sex couples will become the majority (“they will take
over!”).
These arguments are easily rebutted: (1) slavery and men-only elections
were traditions; (2) equal access to legal marriage does not mean equal
access to religious marriage (freedom of religion will protect the right of
individual religious institutions to decide whether or not to marry samesex couples); (3) no different-sex couple is ever asked to prove their
desire or capacity to procreate prior to being issued a marriage license;63
(4) incest and polygamy are entirely separate issues, which couples
consisting of two unrelated men or two unrelated women seeking to
marry are not raising; (5) legal marriage is a public institution which
should be open to everyone; and (6) same-sex couples are likely always
to be a small minority, because it is not discriminatory laws that make
heterosexual people heterosexual (it is likely that members of the
heterosexual majority have as little control over their sexual orientations
as members of the lesbian and gay minority have over theirs).
I would like to conclude with a few more personal notes, and a
comment on the majority position in Utah, which opposes equal access to
marriage for same-sex couples. A theme that I developed briefly in
Dublin in April 2005, when I last saw Professor Lynn Wardle was the
question of lack of empathy on the part of the heterosexual majority,
which I think is an important reason why many heterosexual people do
not reconsider their position on same-sex marriage. I think that
heterosexual people really have to try to put themselves in the position of
a lesbian woman or gay man. Imagine waking up tomorrow in a society
with a lesbian and gay majority, in which heterosexuals are a minority of
2 to 10 percent. You are told that even though you are a man who is
attracted to women, falls in love with women, and wants to spend his life
63. The European Court of Human Rights rejected the “procreative capacity argument” in
Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom (July 11, 2002), para. 98, http://www.echr.coe.int (HUDOC)
(last visited May 8, 2006), in which the male-to-female transsexual applicant was sterile:
“Reviewing the situation in 2002, the Court observes that Article 12 [of the European Convention on
Human Rights] secures the fundamental right of a man and woman to marry and to found a family.
The second aspect is not however a condition of the first and the inability of any couple to conceive
or parent a child cannot be regarded as per se removing their right to enjoy the first limb of this
provision.”
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with a particular woman, you must fight these impulses and seek
treatment, because your feelings are wrong, immoral, and sinful. You
must marry another man, because that is what is right for the majority of
men (who are gay), whether or not it is right for you. Heterosexual
women are told the same thing. In addition to thinking about what it
would be like if the majority and minority positions were reversed,
heterosexual people could also think about what it is like to be lesbian or
gay. It is very easy. A heterosexual woman need only think about the
good feelings of love and physical attraction and pleasure she can
experience with a man. A lesbian woman experiences exactly the same
feelings with another woman. And a gay man experiences exactly the
same feelings with another man as a heterosexual man does with a
woman. Why would you want to deny expression of these very positive
feelings to one of your fellow human beings?
Apart from failing to engage their capacity for empathy, are people
who are opposed to same-sex marriage “homophobic,” i.e., hostile to or
prejudiced against lesbian and gay people? Given that same-sex marriage
is such a recent development, available in only one of fifty states in the
United States and (from Dec. 1, 2006) in only 5 of the 32 other
democracies I mentioned above, I would say a heterosexual person can,
in good faith and without being homophobic, oppose equal access to
legal marriage (and joint adoption) for same-sex couples, because these
are novel ideas with which they are not yet comfortable. However, the
non-homophobic heterosexual opponent of same-sex marriage (and joint
adoption) should be otherwise in favor of legal equality for lesbian and
gay individuals. They should oppose criminalization of private, adult,
consensual, same-sex sexual activity, and support legislation prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation against lesbian and gay
individuals (if not yet same-sex couples) in access to employment,
housing, education and other services. If, unlike the non-homophobic
heterosexual person, you basically dislike same-sex sexual activity and
couple relationships, think that they are wrong, immoral, evil, etc.,
actively supported the “sodomy” law in Utah when it was on the statute
book, or did nothing to help repeal it, and are opposed to or are doing
nothing to support a bill that would protect lesbian women and gay men
in Utah against discrimination in employment , etc., then I would say:
“Yes, you are homophobic!”64
Is it permissible for a Christian to say “I love the sinner (the lesbian
woman or gay man), but I hate his or her sin (same-sex sexual activity

64. See Russell Shorto, What’s Their Real Problem with Gay Marriage? (It’s the Gay Part),
NEW YORK TIMES SUNDAY MAGAZINE, June 19, 2005.
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and couple relationships)”? Imagine if I were to say: “I have nothing
against Mormons. I think that they are wonderful people, and I respect
them, as long as they do not practice their religion.” If I were to say this,
then I think that most of you would say that I was anti-Mormon. That is
certainly not the case that I am anti-Mormon. I perfectly respect the right
of Mormons to practice their religion. What I do not accept is anyone,
from any religion, telling me how I should live my life, in relation to my
sexual orientation. I accept and respect your religion. All I ask is that you
accept and respect my sexual orientation.65
I would like to thank Professor Lynn Wardle for inviting me to speak
at this conference. As an openly gay man, I do not feel welcome in Utah,
and I hesitated to come. When I arrived in Salt Lake City, the first place I
visited was one where I felt welcome—it was not Temple Square.
Rather, it was the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Community
Center of Utah,66 where I purchased this souvenir running tank top:
“Utah Pride 2005:67 Equal Rights–No More No Less.”
I think it is a good idea for Brigham Young University to invite more
openly lesbian and gay speakers,68 because there is a desperate need for
more contact between openly lesbian and gay people and religious
communities. This will help members of religious communities to realize
that lesbian women and gay men are not such bad people, and that we
should be allowed to lead our lives as we see fit. Referring to my own
life, I enjoyed a loving relationship for fifteen years with my male
partner, until he decided to end our relationship in September 2004. I
hope to find love again with another man, and perhaps to get married
now that it is legally possible. My eighty-year-old mother has waited a
long time and would be very pleased. The wedding could now take place
in my home city of Calgary, and even at the Woodcliff United Church
where I attended kindergarten. The United Church of Canada is the
largest Protestant denomination in Canada. Legal same-sex marriages
have been possible in United Churches, depending on the policy of each
congregation, since 2003.69 Would a few same-sex couples from Salt
65. See Robert Wintemute, “Sexual Orientation and the Charter: The Achievement of Formal
Legal Equality (1985-2005) and Its Limits,” (2004) 49 MCGILL L.J. 1143, available at
http://www.journal.law.mcgill.ca/abs/vol49/4winte.html (last visited May 8, 2006).
66. See http://www.glbtccu.org.
67. See http://www.utahpride.org.
68. See BYU, U. of U. Ranked Low in Acceptance of Queer Students, SALT LAKE METRO,
Sept. 1, 2005, at 10 (Princeton Review ranks BYU 352nd of 361 U.S. universities and colleges for
acceptance of lesbian and gay people).
69. See Information sheet on covenant of marriage, United Church of Canada, available at
http://www.united-church.ca/moderator/short/2003/1008c (38th General Council, 2003: “The United
Church of Canada resolved to call upon the Government of Canada to recognize same-sex marriage
in the marriage legislation.”).
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Lake City like to join me?70 I would point out, on behalf of the Calgary
tourism officials, that Calgary is currently the closest city for same-sex
couples in Utah who would like to get married— only a two-hour flight
to the north. I am sure that you can get attractive honeymoon packages at
the Banff Springs and Chateau Lake Louise Hotels.
The position of the United Church of Canada is the one I hope that
all religious institutions will reach eventually. At its 37th General
Council in 2000, the Church affirmed that “human sexual relations,
whether heterosexual or homosexual, are a gift from God and part of the
marvellous diversity of creation.”71 I certainly consider my own capacity
to feel sexually attracted to other men, to experience sexual pleasure with
other men, and to fall in love with other men, as a gift from God. I would
say to opponents of same-sex marriage, and supporters of the “Federal
Marriage Protection Amendment,” with the greatest respect, that despite
your good intentions, you have made a mistake on this issue. I would
urge you to accept this mistake, to stop opposing legal equality for
lesbian and gay individuals and same-sex couples, and to find a genuine
social problem, such as racism or poverty, in the United States or the
developing world, to which you could devote your time, energy, and
money. Working to make life more difficult for your fellow human
beings who are lesbian and gay is not something of which your
grandchildren, or your grandnephews and grandnieces, will be proud. I
am glad to see that, in the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa, the
leadership has realized the mistake they made by supporting
discrimination against lesbian and gay people.72
Same-sex marriage is coming to Utah. The “Federal Marriage
Protection Amendment” will never be adopted. The U.S. Supreme Court
will invalidate the remaining anti-same-sex marriage constitutional
amendments sometime between 2022 and 2045, which is between 19 and
42 years from the 2003 decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in Goodridge.73 The period of 19 years represents the gap
between two decisions on laws banning different-race marriage: the
Perez74 decision of the Supreme Court of California in 1948, striking

70. If they are Mormon, they could face disciplinary action. See “Mormon in Legal Gay
Marriage
[in
Toronto]
Faces
Expulsion”
(March
15,
2006),
available
at
http://www.365gay.com/Newscon06/03/031506mormon.htm (last visited May 8, 2006).
71. See id.
72. See Dutch Reformed Church’s statement, available at http://www.365gay.com
/newscon04/11/112204safChurch.htm (last visted May 8, 2006): “We would like to ask forgiveness
for the pain and suffering that we caused you and your families in the past. We accept that what we
did in the past was wrong.”
73. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
74. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
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down California’s law, and the Loving75 decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1967, striking down all remaining laws of this kind. The period
of 42 years represents the gap between the first repeal of a “sodomy” law
(in Illinois in 1961), and the Lawrence76 decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in 2003, striking down all remaining laws of this kind. Once samesex couples are able to marry in Utah, perhaps my future spouse and I
will, if we live that long, come to Utah to renew our vows. Thank you.

75. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
76. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Appendix A:
Progression To Same-Sex Marriage In The First
15 European Union Member States
(Year The Law Was Enacted)
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+
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Spain

1988

1995

2005

2005

1998-

2005

2005

200379
80

Netherlands

1971

1991

2000

2000

1997

1997

2000

Sweden

1978

1987

2002

2002

1994

1994

committee

81

UK

2000

2003

2002

2002

2004

2004

———

Belgium

1985

2003

200582

1998

2003

Denmark

1976

1987

1999

2005
———

1989

1989

2003
———

Finland

1998

1995

———

2001

2001
———

Germany

1994

2003

France

1982

1985

Luxembourg

1992

1997

Portugal

exceptions

2003

Ireland

exceptions

1993

Italy

1889

2003

Austria

2002

2003

Greece

exceptions

2003

2004
———

———
———
———

2001

———
———

———

———

———

———

200183
———

———

———

———

———

———

———

———

———

———

———

———

———

———
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———

———

———

———

———

———

———

———

———
———
———

1999
2004

77. National legislation Directive 2000/78/EC (in force 2 Dec. 2003).
78. Perhaps excluding certain parental rights (adoption, medically assisted procreation).
79. Laws in the comunidades autónomas (regions).
80. The Netherlands plan to remove the exception for intercountry adoption in 2006 or 2007.
81. Adoption and Children Act 2002; England and Wales only; in force on 30 Dec. 2005;
proposed for Scotland (second-parent and joint adoption.
82. See http://www.senat.be: Projet de loi modifiant certaines dispositions du Code civil en
vue de permettre l’adoption par des personnes de même sexe (Bill to modify certain provisions of the
Civil Code to permit adoption by persons of the same sex), passed by the House of Representatives
on Dec. 1, 2005, and by the Senate on April 20, 2006 (second-parent and joint adoption).
83. Recognition of de facto cohabitation; there is no register.
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Appendix B:
Progression To Same-Sex Marriage In Selected
Canadian Provinces and U.S. States
(Year The Law Was Enacted Or Year Of Court Decision)
Province
or State
Note: dates
not
available
for step
(1), repeal
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(2)(a)
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either partner)

same-sex
couples:
register
+
some rights

same-sex
couples:
register
+
equal
rights

same-sex
couples:
register
+
equal rights
+
same name
(legal
marriage)

Québec

1969

1977

1991

1991

2002

2002

200484

Ontario

1969

1986

1995

1995

2003

2003

2003

British

1969

1992

1995

1995

2003

2003

2003

197485

1989

1993

1993

2003

2003

200386

Vermont

1977

1991

1993

1993

1999/200087

1999/2000

———

Connecticu

1969

1991

2000

2000

2005

2005

———

1975

1992

2003

2003

1999

200388

1995
———

1995
———

———
———

———

———
———

———

———
———

———
———

Columbia
Massachus
etts

t
California
New York

1980

Texas

200390

89

2002
———

Florida

2003

———

———91

———

Mississippi

2003

———

———92

———

———

———

———

93

———

———

———

Utah

2003

———

———

———

84. The 2003 and 2004 judgments of the Courts of Appeal of Ontario, British Columbia and
Québec were extended to all 10 provinces and 3 territories by the federal Civil Marriage Act in 2005.
85. Invalid as applied to “consensual conduct in private between adults.” See Commonwealth
v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478 (Mass. 1974), as clarified by Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders
v. Attorney General, 763 N.E.2d 38 (Mass. 2002).
86. State recognition of same-sex couples generally does not apply at the federal level.
87. Vermont Supreme Court in 1999, legislature in 2000.
88. Some exceptions, e.g., with regard to state taxation.
89. But legislation was passed by New York City in 1986.
90. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
91. See Florida Statutes ch. 63.042, s. 3 (added in 1977): “No person eligible to adopt under
this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.”
92. See Mississippi Code Annotated, § 93-17-3(2) (added in 2000), which provides that
“[a]doption by couples of the same gender is prohibited.”
93. Utah expressly bans individual adoption by “a person who is cohabiting [residing with
another person and being involved in a sexual relationship with that person] in a relationship that is
not a legally valid and binding marriage under the laws of this state.” See Utah Code Annotated ss.
78-30-1(3)(b), 78-30-9(3) (added in 2000).
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Appendix C:
Overview Of International Trend: Legal
Recognition Of Same-Sex Couples
Level of recognition
of same-sex couples

Separate institution for same-sex couples
(X = also for a few different-sex couples)

1) Legal marriage
(but * = no federal
recognition yet)

(2) Alternative
registration system
(a) package of
rights/duties equal or
almost equal to legal
marriage
(but * = no federal
recognition yet)

(b) package of
rights/duties
substantially inferior
to legal marriage
(and * = no federal
recognition yet)

(3) Unregistered
cohabitation
(package of
rights/duties varies
greatly, but is often
substantially inferior
to legal marriage; no
registration required,
but minimum
cohabitation period
must be satisfied)

separate but mostly equal
- Denmark (registered partnership)
- Finland (registered partnership)
- Iceland (confirmed cohabitation)
- Norway (registered partnership)
- Sweden (registered partnership)
- Switzerland (registered partnership)
- United Kingdom (civil partnership)
- USA (California)*X (domestic partnership)
- USA (Connecticut)* (civil union)
- USA (Vermont)* (civil union)
separate and clearly unequal
- Czech Republic (registered partnership)
- Germany (problem in Bundesrat) (registered life
partnership)
- Switzerland (Zürich)* (registered partnership)
- USA (Hawaii)*X (reciprocal beneficiaries)
- USA (New Jersey)*X (domestic partnership)

examples:
- UK (former rule: immigration for partners legally
unable to marry) (mainly same-sex)
- USA (some public and private sector employers’
benefit plans only recognize same-sex partners
unable to marry and not unmarried different-sex
partners of employees)

Institution open to all couples, different-sex
or same-sex
- Netherlands (2000, in force in 2001)
- Belgium (2003)
- Canada (Ontario, British Columbia in 2003;
federal legislation for all provinces/territories in
2005)
- Massachusetts, since May 17, 2004*
- Spain (2005)
- South Africa (from Dec. 1, 2006)
- Sweden (2007?)
not separate and mostly equal
- Australia (Tasmania)* (registered deed of
relationship)
- Canada (Québec) (civil union)
- Netherlands (registered partnership)
- New Zealand (civil union)

not separate but clearly unequal
- Andorra (stable unions of couples)
- Argentina (Buenos Aires)*
- Belgium (statutory cohabitation)
- Canada (Alberta, Manitoba, Nova Scotia)
- France (pacte civil de solidarité)
- Luxembourg (déclaration de partenariat)
- Spain (laws in at least 12 of 17 regions)
- Switzerland (Geneva, Neuchâtel)*
- USA (District of Columbia and many cities)*
(domestic partnership)
examples:
- Australia (most states/territories but generally
not federal level)
- Canada (federal level and most
provinces/territories)
- Croatia
- France (concubinage)
- Hungary
- Netherlands
- New Zealand
- Portugal
- Slovenia
- South Africa
- Sweden
- United Kingdom

